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Ecstasy and Nonduality: 
On Comparing Varieties of Immanence 
John J. Thatamanil 
V anderbilt University Divinity School 
Immanence and Scripture 
FOR the benefit of those who have not read my 
book, let me offer a few framing remarks. I 
begin by noting that my initial working title for 
the book was Ecstasy and Nonduality, not The 
Immanent Divine. Although somewhat technical, 
the earlier title had the virtue of stipulating that 
my book compares two specific types of divine 
immanence. I root each sort of immanence in a 
fundamental scriptural locus within the Christian 
and Hindu traditions. In the Christian case, the 
scriptural text is Romans 8:26, "Likewise the 
Spirit helps us in our weakness; for we do not 
know how to pray as we ought, but that very 
Spirit intercedes with sighs too deep for words" 
(NRSV). The King James Version reads, 
"Likewise the Spirit also helpeth our infirmities: 
for we know not what we should pray for as we 
ought: but the Spirit itself maketh intercession 
for us with groanings which cannot be uttered." 
In the Hindu case, the scriptural text is the 
Upanishadic mahavakya, "Aham Brahmasmi" 
from Brhadaranyaka Upanishad 1.4.10. In this 
Christian scripture, divine immanence is 
experienced as an ecstatic event accomplished 
by the work of the Holy Spirit that grasps and 
prays through us when we know not how to 
pray. In the Hindu scripture, immanence is given 
by way of nonduality: one just is Brahman. 
Rather than examining and comparing these 
verses directly, I turned to two theologians 
whose entire corpus can be read as extended 
commentary on these verses. In the Christian 
case, I chose Paul Tillich and in the Hindu case, 
Sankara. So, contrary to McLaughlin's 
contention that the book begins with and adheres 
to some vaguely Spinozistic or Deleuzian notion 
of immanence rather than begin by way of 
scripture, this book is about just these two 
modes of healing immanence as understood by 
way of theological reflection on key scriptural 
loci. My book also concludes by suggesting that 
Tillich's fondness for Romans 8:26 can be 
enriched by a fuller attention to Galatians 2:20 
:where Paul writes, "And it is no longer I who 
live, but it is Christ who lives in me." This more 
stable and enduring kind of immanence 
bespeaks a strong doctrine of sanctification, one 
that remains insufficiently developed in Tillich's 
own theology - but might be possible for 
Tillichians after a more thorough encounter with 
Sankara's nondualism. 
The compelling and challenging question 
that might be put to my book is whether I have 
selected the right H~du conversation partner. 
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After all, there is no shortage of ecstatic 
immanence in Hindu traditions. I am thinking in 
particular of the Tamil poet-saint Nammalvar 
and by extension of the Sri Vaisnava tradition 
for whom he is central. Nammalvar believes that 
his own poetry is itself the Lord's singing 
through him. 1 Here we fmd what appears to be a 
profound homology to the Pauline notion of the 
Spirit that prays in us. The challenge to be posed 
to a work like mine is not that it has embraced 
some generic extrascriptural notion of 
immanence but that it has not engaged the right 
sort of immanence. To such a hypothetical 
challenge, I respond as follows: we need a wide 
variety of comparative projects in order to 
understand better the relationship between 
Hindu and Christian traditions and thinkers. I 
welcome such additional projects and would 
argue that there is no such thing as a "natural" 
comparison. I venture a comparison of Tillich 
and Sankara precisely because Sankara's 
nondualism is a more difficult and demanding 
challenge to Christian habits of mind whereas 
Sri Vaisnava traditions and the theology of 
Ramanuja are likely to seem more familiar. 
Moreover, both Tillich and Sankara, although 
they appeal to different types of immanence, 
share a deep commitment to the notion that 
ultimate reality is not a being among beings and 
is moreover transpersonal.2 That said, a three 
way exchange between Tillich, Sankara and 
Ramanuja is very much needed if we are to 
clarify ongoing conversations on the relationship 
between God and the world especially those that 
go by the name of panentheism. 
The Question of Orientalism 
Writing comparative theology is a complex 
matter fraught with a great many dangers. The 
sins of 19th century predecessors who went by 
the name "comparative theologian" inevitably 
weigh upon the mind. In my case, writing as I 
am about Sankara and Tillich,a preoccupation 
with Rudolf Otto was inevitable. I am thinking 
in particular of his important work Mysticism 
East and West which offered a full-scale 
comparison of Eckhart and Sankara.3 Tillich's 
indebtedness to Eckhart makes this comparison 
an especially sensitive matter. Those who have 
taken the time to read Otto's book carefully will 
know that it is a sophisticated and careful work, 
one that gets Sankara right in multiple ways, 
most especially in Otto's appreciation of the 
often overlooked theistic dimensions of 
Sankara's thought. Nonetheless, his work has 
rightly come in for criticism for drawing a sharp 
and asymmetrical dichotomy between East and 
West, between a passive and ethically deficient 
Eastern mysticism and a dynamic and world-
affirming Western mysticism., On every relevant 
point of comparison, Eckhart's mysticism is 
shown to be superior to Sankara's mysticism. In 
a post-Saidian, postcolonial world to replay such 
dichotomous dualisms would amount to an 
unpardonable sin. I wrote my book with a 
hypersensitivity to that issue and strove 
assiduously to avoid that sin. Whether I erred by 
remaining so focused on avoiding that particular 
error and thereby fell prey to a whole host of 
others is a question that I must largely (though 
not wholly) leave for my readers. 
It, therefore, gave me no small pause to see 
that Michelle Voss Robert's response begins 
with just these considerations. Thankfully and to 
my immense relief, Roberts judges that I have 
not fallen prey to the sin of the old orientalism. 
Her worry is rather different, and in truth, 
equally as frightening-all the more so because 
it is a sin that I had not considered. She poses 
the question shrewdly and with remarkable skill. 
Writing about Rambachan's and my world-
affirming Advaita, she writes "Are these 
dynamic, active, worldly non-dualisms new 
vindications of an essentially 'Christian' way of 
thinking? Do Christianity and the West still win 
out in the end? Is it all just a 'logic of the same' 
in which Advaita Vedanta now mirrors the West 
positively instead of serving as its photographic 
negative-in other words, does Advaita now 
gain credibility because it so closely resembles 
what the West values?" I consider this a 
genuinely probing and important question. 
Thankfully, Roberts has exonerated both 
Rambachan and me from this charge, and for 
that I am both grateful and relieved. For my 
part, I would point only to the way in which 
Rambachan and I generate our more world-
affIrming reading of Sallkara. First, both of us 
explicitly recognize that Sankara had little 
patience for subjective idealism of the sort that 
he found in Buddhist Y ogacara. Sankara 
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explicitly rejected the idea that the world was 
merely a projection of mind just as he rejected 
the idea that there is no fundamental difference 
between the waking state and the dream state. 
Secondly, Rambachan makes an additional 
appeal to key Upanishadic texts to justify a more 
world-affIrming reading of Advaita. These are 
but two of many examples that demonstrate that 
a world-affIrming reading of Advaita is not 
derived by appeal to extrinsic Christian sources 
or norms. As Roberts rightly notes, the very 
charge that a world-affirming Advaita can only 
be generated by readers motivated by Christian 
concerns is to suggest that only Christians and 
the West are capable of world-affIrmative 
reflection. Orientalism indeed! That said, 
Roberts is right to urge us to proceed further by 
developing the resources of a world-affirming 
Advaita for a variety of ends including 
ecological ethics. 
Learning from Sankara: On Apophatic 
Anthropology and the Status of Avidya 
At this juncture, I would like to note that my 
own overriding theological concern is whether 
Christian theology might more closely mirror 
Advaita rather than the other way around. The 
charge that would genuinely count against my 
project is one that contends that despite offering 
another more or less careful reading of Advaita, 
I have l~arned nothing from it, that my Christian 
theology continues on its course very much as it 
would have prior to encounter with Sankara. 
That charge strikes me as more serious because I 
believe that we are most likely to avoid old 
orientalisms just to the extent that we learn with 
and from persons of other traditions and are 
transformed by that learning. 
For the sake of brevity, let me enumerate 
just two of the principle lessons that I have 
learned from Sankara. First, affirming 
nonduality does not amount to eviscerating 
transcendence. Put simply, the Advaita 
affIrmation that the true self (atman) just is 
Brahman, the ultimate world ground, is not to 
know what Brahman is. As Rambachan and I 
both show, Sankara is absolutely relentless in 
affirming that even the most cherished terms in 
the Advaita vocabulary-self (atman), 
conscious1).ess (cit), and being (sat)-are not 
ultimate and must fmally be surpassed. The 
resulting position might well be called an 
'.'apophatic anthropology," one in which the true 
self remains necessarily a mystery to itself. The 
old Delphic and Socratic imperative, "Know 
Thyself' is accomplished, most paradoxically, 
when we realize that we cannot in fact know 
what we most truly are. Sankara's Advaita 
generates the most radical coincidence between 
immanence and what I am calling a noetic 
transcendence rather than a spatialized 
transcendence. Contrary to the possible 
apprehension that nonduality eviscerates 
transcendence, I show that Advaita excludes 
only a spatialized traJ;lscendence. True, a visual 
metaphor that imagines Brahman as being 
elsewhere and above the world simply makes no 
sense from within Sankara's frame as my very 
being just is Brahman. But having said that, 
Sankara compels me to add that Brahman 
remains that from which all words and 
cognitions must fall away. Brahman is an 
excessive mystery to which language and 
thought is necessarily inadequate. 
The second major lesson I draw from 
Sankara is that one can generate a profound and 
sobering account of the human predicament 
without rooting it in a fundamental ontological 
fault or rupture. Sankara presents a devastating 
picture of human life as marked by craving 
(raga) and aversion (dvesa), by grief (soka) and 
delusion (moha), which are in turn rooted in 
fundamental ignorance (avidya). Nonetheless, 
Sankara also consistently refuses to theorize 
avidya. If samsara as marked by craving, 
aversion, grief, and delusion is Sankara's 
diagnosis of the human predicament and if 
avidya is Sankara's etiological explanation for 
how we come to be in this predicament, Sankara 
refuses to make the further move of asking about 
the very condition for the possibility of 
ignorance. He does not ask, "Why avidya?," 
because to take the question seriously would 
result in dualism. If avidya is taken to be real-
and those who believe that avidya must be 
explained necessarily assume that it is 
ontologically real-then there would be a 
second reality' over against Brahman and 
Advaita would be negated. As Daniel Ingalls has 
shown, for Sankara ignorance is a practical, 
pedagogical, and even soteriological problem 
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that needs to be addressed and treated but not 
theorized.4 
The Problem of Evil 
And this question about the status of 
ignorance brings me to McLaughlin's challenge 
that my position, derived from Sankara, risks 
trivializing evil and underplays the reality of the 
tragic. McLaughlin suggests that in my 
commitment to keep with Sankara's strong 
account of divine immanence, I willfully ignore 
the brutalities of human history and wish away 
the tragic complexities of human experience, 
even or perhaps especially that of would be 
saints. But, as I have already shown, I explicitly 
commend both Sankara and Tillich for their 
strong and compelling diagnoses of the human 
predicament. Indeed, I explicitly critique 
Vivekananda's polemic against Christianity 
famously epitomized in his fiery proclamation, 
"It is a sin to call men sinners."s Vivekananda 
hopes to counter abusive treatments of Hindu 
traditions by contending that Hinduism, unlike 
Christian faith, affirms the dignity of the human 
soul by refusing to call human beings sinners. 
But Vivekananda's assertion fails to register· 
much in Sankara's Advaita. While the term sin 
is absent, I spend many pages demonstrating that 
Sankara offers a devastating account of the 
human predicament and afflictions (klesa) that 
compromise human life. I do so explicitly to 
undo Vivekananda's occidentalism which is 
itself an aggressive inversion of orientalism. I 
dwell on this point because I am convinced that 
sensitive and nuanced comparative theology 
cannot get underway if comparativists do not 
break out of such polemical loops. 
What I leave behind in Tillich is not his 
bleak diagnosis of the human predicament but 
rather his limited prognosis and even more so 
the ontology that renders such a prognosis 
inevitable. Sankara's Advaita by contrast 
demonstrates that there need be no necessary 
connection between a grave diagnosis of the 
human predicament and a limited prognosis of 
the same. Just as a patient might simultaneously 
hear both that he has cancer and that the cancer 
is entirely curable, it is possible to generate an 
acute account of the human predicament and yet 
to affirm a robust hope for comprehensive 
healing.6 What I reject in Tillich is his near 
claim that human fallenness is ontologicaUy 
necessary and his explicit claim that fallenness 
is ontologicaUy unavoidable. For Tillich, 
creatures can only be free if they stand outside 
the divine life, but just because they stand 
outside the divine life, their fallenness is 
unavoidable. Freedom comes with a very steep 
price as it perpetually threatens anything like a 
progressive movement into sanctification. In 
contrast to Tillich, I explicitly join Sankara in 
affirming that human beings can be both free 
and "fallen" without positing a fundamental 
dualism or distance between self and divinity. 
One can be Brahman and yet also be caught up 
in suffering of the human predicament. No 
attempt is made to explain just how this is 
possible. The task at hand is not to offer an 
explanation but rather to bring about liberation.7 
My own primary motives are soteriological: 
I refuse to posit a fundamental rupture between 
God and humanity in order to allow for richer 
prospects for spiritual perfection, understood as 
sanctification in Christian traditions and living 
liberation (jivanmukti) in Sankara. Against 
Tillich's Lutheranism which offers relatively 
limited expectations for sanctification and is 
entirely lacking in any account of spiritual 
discipline-the latter always come under 
suspicion of works righteousness-I stand with 
both Wesley and Sankara in their sense that 
human beings are capable of experiencing deep 
and healing transformation. It is . true that 
Sankara is absolutely relentless in affirming that 
liberation cannot be generated by action; Tillich 
would concur. But unlike Tillich, Sankara offers 
an account of karma yoga as a preparatory 
spiritual discipline that can make room for 
liberating knowledge. Moreover, once such 
liberating knowledge takes hold, the liberated 
person (jivanmukta) can live a life that is beyond 
bondage to afflictions and faults and in so doing 
live out a life of spontaneous compassion. Such 
a person is no longer obligated to follow ethical 
norms of dharma. In that sense, the jivanmukta 
is to use the Pauline phrase beyond the law. 
This trajectory of thought should suffice to 
counter or at least' to soften McLaughlin's 
charge that I offer no account of spiritual 
transformation. Perhaps I do not go far enough, 
but I surely argue that resources for such an 
T 
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account of spiritual discipline can be found in 
Sankara's thought especially in his Gitabhasya. 
Since McLaughlin has explicitly raised the 
question of whether the vision I articulate can 
offer robust possibilities for self-sacrifice and 
even martyrdom, let me add here that· I believe 
that we have grounds for believing that human 
beings are capable of radical spiritual disciplines 
such as those of nonviolent resistance-ahimsa 
expressed as satyagraha-just to the extent that 
human beings possess, or are endowed by 
participation in the divine life, with the capacity 
for radical non-egocentric compassion even 
when confronted by the most vicious and brutal 
forms of human evil. 
McLaughlin believes that I can generate my 
optimistic account of human spiritual capacities 
only by downplaying any serious account of the 
human predicament. He fmds this inadequacy 
expressed in my vague categories of 
estrangement and self-enclosed fmitude which 
sound far less dire and depressing than 
traditional Christian talk about sin and guilt. I 
believe that McLaughlin has overlooked-
. perhaps I underemphasized the point-that I 
appeal to a more abstract terminology, in part, 
because I believe that configurations of sin and 
alienation are deeply local Tillich himself noted 
that Christian understandings of the human 
predicament have shifted markedly over the 
course of western history. For the early Church, 
the human predicament was experienced as 
bondage to the powers of sin, death, and the 
devil. In the medieval period, the human 
predicament was experienced in terms of guilt 
and debt, a debt that must be paid to the Divine. 
Against these culturally contingent 
configurations of sin, Tillich argued that sin or 
estrangement in his own time had to be 
reconfigured in terms of meaninglessness. 
The more abstracted or "vague" account of 
sin as estrangement or self-enclosed finitude is, 
at least in part, my attempt to recognize that the 
human predicament can take on a variety of 
local configurations in different historical and 
cultural milieus. My goal is not to downplay 
these particular configurations of estrangement 
but rather to be cautious about imposing some 
particular theological anthropology or some 
particular account of the human predicament as 
universal, and then writing such accounts into 
one's ontology. I am thinking here of forms of 
missionary malpractice that have insisted that 
only Christian tradition has the cure for the 
disease of sin and guilt while ignoring that other 
traditions do not diagnose or experience the 
human predicament in these terms. Such 
missionizing ends up selling not just the 
Christian cure but also as it happens the 
Christian disease, a disease that the missionized 
did not even know they had! 
In sum, from Tillich I have learned to be 
attentive to the variety of ways in which the 
human predicament is configured and from 
Sankara, I have learned not to ontologize any 
such account as implying a tragic rupture 
between human beingsc and divinity. My sense is 
that McLaughlin has overestimated my 
indebtedness to Neville who takes up no more 
than 20 pages of my book and has 
\underestimated my indebtedness to both Tillich 
and most especially to Sankara. 
More fundamentally, McLaughlin's most 
profound worries about my project surface at 
just those moments when I try to reconfigure 
Christian theology by appeal to Sankara. At just 
these moments, we hear predictable worries 
,about syncretism, about the melding of religious 
traditions. The constraints of space will not 
permit me to offer an extended response to these 
and other noteworthy objections that 
McLaughlin advances concerning agency, heroic 
self-sacrifice, and the nature of spiritual 
disciplines. 
I conclude by asserting that if comparative 
theology fails to learn from and be transformed 
by interreligious encounter, it will surely fall 
prey to the errors of the Christian colonial past, 
the errors that Roberts so well enumerates. The 
other will remain not only other, but an other to 
be refuted, chastened, or converted possessing at 
most "a ray of that truth" found in the fullness of 
Christian tradition. McLaughlin's appeal to 
N astra Aetate suggests that he remains unwilling 
to move beyond the version of inclusivism 
articulated in that Vatican II document. This 
refusal leaves us with the impression that 
Christians have nothing at all to learn from what 
others have come to know about God by way of 
their own deep traditions. But if in fact 
Christians have little to learn, and if moreover, 
any such learning amounts to a syncretism that 
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brings with it the threat of identity loss, then 
why venture into comparative theology at all? 
An older style of apologetics would suffice. 
Notes 
1 "My lord/who swept me away forever/into joy that 
day,/made me over into himself/and sang in 
Tamillhis own sweet songs/through me .... " 
Nammalvar, Hymns for the Drowning: Poems for 
Visnu by Nammalvar, trans. A.K. Ramanujan (New 
York: Penguin Books, 1993) 85. 
2 By now, the notion that Tillich or Sankara holds to 
an impersonal or nonpersonal conception of divinity 
has largely been discredited in the relevant scholarly 
communities. However, the notion that ultimate 
reality cannot be characterized as either a person or 
as a being among beings does mean that in some 
sense ultimate reality exceeds the personal. Hence, 
my term "transpersonal." 
3 Rudolf Otto, Mysticism East and West: A 
Comparative Analysis of the Nature of Mysticism, 
trans. Bertha L. Bracey (1932; reprint, Wheaton, Ill: 
The Theosophical Publishing House, 1987). 
4 Daniel H. H. Ingalls, "Sankara on the Question: 
Whose is Avidya?" Philosophy East and West 3:1 
(1953) 69-72. 
5 Vivekananda, "Chicago Addresses," The Yogas and 
Other Works, ed. Swami Nikhi1ananda (New York: 
Ramakrishna-Vivekananda Center, 1953), 188. . 
6 Indeed, one might well wonder if any tradition can 
endure if it either trivializes the gravity of the human 
predicament as experienced and suffered or fails to 
offer a deep and lasting hope for treating that 
predicament. Might it be a cross-cultural criterion for 
assessing the adequacy of a religious vision that it 
must accomplish both tasks well? 
7, Although space constraints prevent the possibility 
of venturing a full scale argument, I believe that 
Sankara's refusal to provide an ontology of avidya 
has intriguing resonances with a long N eoplatonic 
and Christian theological trajectory that treats evil as 
privation and insists that it has no positive reality or 
being. As noted earlier, it is precisely' because 
Sankara does not want to give avidya any ontological 
status that he refuses to give a theoretical account of 
avidya and its origins. 
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